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IS IT A SHORT TRIP BACK TO MANOR






AMIDST the faithful teachings of Old Major, Animalism grew.'
_ Though the vision of Napoleon and Snowball differed in several
I respects, the Rebellion succeeded and "The Seven Command-
ments" were promulgated-or at least painted on the wall. The guise of
service for joy and the dignity of labour at "The Animal Farm" served the
animals well. Nevertheless, slow transformations occurred. For instance,
"No animal shall kill any other animal," was ever so slightly altered to
"[n]o animal shall kill any other animal without cause." "No animal shall
drink alcohol" likewise craftily welcomed "to excess" into its comman-
deering stare.2 While four legs were good, two legs were found to be
undoubtedly better.3 Only substance mattered after all. Without obvious
tremor, however, the blunt tyranny soon replaced formality in total. The
Seven Commandments were entirely eliminated. In their place, "ALL
ANIMALS ARE EQUAL BUT SOME ANIMALS ARE MORE EQUAL THAN
OTHERS."' 4 With delicate art and restrained pride, the once proud
"Animal Farm" was abolished. "Henceforward the farm was to be
known as 'The Manor Farm'-which, [Napoleon] believed, was its correct
and original name."'5 "To the prosperity of The Manor Farm!"'6
Building on data obtained in a nationwide survey of the jury system,
this article explores modern mechanisms that subtly dig into the civil
jury's traditional province. Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham remarked
that: "[t]he jury system is under attack by certain elitists in our society
* J.D., Southern Methodist University, May 2001. Judicial Clerk to the Honorable
Barbara M.G. Lynn, Northern District of Texas, 2001-2002. Judicial Clerk to the Honora-
ble Carolyn Dineen King, Chief Judge for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, 2002-2003.
1. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1946).
2. Id. at 91.
3. Id. at 112.
4. Id.




who think that they are better-suited to make decisions than 12 ordinary
citizens . . . The people pushing these efforts simply don't trust juries.
They supported the move from 12 jurors to six because six is halfway to
zero and that's where they want to go."'7 Are those willing to reduce the
role of the civil jury hoping it will suffer the fate of the civil jury in En-
gland-all but abolished by habit? 8 While some with a straight face ar-
gue for this result,9 the absolute end is unlikely. Nonetheless, the slow
drain of its vigor through expanded appellate review, evidentiary shifts of
power from jury to judge, and designations of questions as "a matter of
law" arguably resembles Napoleon's methodical plan back to Manor.
The Dallas Morning News and SMU Law Review conducted a sixteen-
month study of the civil and criminal jury system. The study questions
federal and state trial judges concerning the status of the modern criminal
and civil jury. Though judicial responses have been measured before, this
study worked from a specific foundation. First, the study focused broadly
on two complete arenas. It questioned all federal trial judges throughout
the United States and all state trial judges within the State of Texas. This
allowed the entire federal trial system to be juxtaposed against an entire
state system. Second, questions focused on the future of the jury system
to ascertain both whether they were witness to a modern reduction in an
individual's jury right and whether further reductions were on the hori-
zon. Third, questions involved both abstract inquiries into the goals and
effectiveness of the jury system as well as behavioral inquiries probing
specific situations where the judge had disregarded jury conclusions. This
structure allowed judicial attitudes to be contrasted with judicial behav-
iors in hopes of better understanding nationwide trends.
Questionnaires were sent to federal trial judges throughout the United.
States and to state trial judges in Texas.' 0 A 66-percent response rate
resulted in the federal camp (594 federal district judge respondents) and a
70-percent response rate resulted in the state arena (393 Texas state judge
respondents)." The judges were asked thirty-eight questions dealing
with both the civil and the criminal jury. As discussed, the questions
ranged from abstract inquiries targeting views of the proper role of the
jury to more individualized questions pursuing the frequency with which
7. Mark Curriden, Tipping the Scales: Right to Trial by Jury Fades Under Court Rul-
ings, New Laws, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 7, 2000, at 1A [hereinafter Curriden,
Tipping the Scales], available at 2000 WL 2033720.
8. Patrick E. Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation
of Judicial Power, 56 TEXAS L. REV. 47, 50 (1977).
9. John E. Babiarz, Jr., Justice Without a Jury: In Civil Cases, a Judge May be the
Better Arbiter, NEWS JOURNAL (Wilmington, Del. March 12, 2000), available at http://www/
delawareonline.com/opinion/perspect/perspect03122000.html ("[B]ecause results would
become more predictable, more disputes will be resolved by settlement and perhaps with-
out litigation.").
10. Article I, § 15, and Article V, § 10, of the Texas Constitution, like most (49) other
states guarantees the right to a jury trial, except in certain limited circumstances. State v.
Credit Bureau of Laredo, Inc., 530 S.W.2d 288, 291-92 (Tex. 1975).
11. See R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Jury and Negligence: The View from the
Bench, 26 GA. L. REV. 85, 94 (1991) ("a return rate of twenty percent would be 'normal"')..
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the judge increased or decreased jury verdicts. The Dallas Morning News
utilized the responses and resulting data in a series of articles relating to
public perception of the jury. SMU Law Review likewise assessed the
data in a series of articles ranging from the modern use of jury consul-
tants to current reform efforts. This article draws on the data to further
the premise that despite giving the jury high marks on its success at reach-
ing a "fair and just" verdict, trial and appellate court judges alter specific
jury determinations in practice. Instead of obvious reductions, such as a
diminution in the number of jurors, the article argues that subtle restric-
tions have lessened an individual's jury right within the last thirty years.
To research this path, some of the salient responses to eleven of the
thirty-eight questions from the study are broken down by the following
demographic factors:
* COURT: This breakdown compares state and federal court responses,
responses from Texas judges sitting in highly populated areas to
those sitting in sparsely populated areas,12 and federal court re-
sponses by circuit.
* JUDGE: This breakdown compares responses with regard to gender,13
political ideology, 14 and employment background in either public or
private service. 15
In 1966, Kalven and Zeisel reported that 78% of the judges in civil
cases would have decided cases the same as the jury.16 Data from the
SMU Law Review study reaffirms this agreement between judges and ju-
ries on the outcome of cases. In contrast, significant numbers of respon-
12. For Texas judges, the study broke geographic areas into four groups: those with a
resident population greater than 500,000, those with a resident population between 50,000
and 500,000, those with a resident population between 10,000 and 50,000, and those with a
resident population below 10,000. To facilitate reporting, this Article compares the ex-
tremes-those responses from judges in areas with populations greater than 500,000 to
those in areas with less than 10,000.
13. TABLE 1:
State Federal Total
Male 76.1% (299) 88.6% (526) 825





This Article mainly examines the "conservative" and the "liberal" responses as opposed to
the "moderate" responses. Noteworthy, the "moderate" responses coincided significantly
with the "conservative" responses as to most questions.
15. TABLE 3:
State Federal
Private 45%(123) 56.2 %(334)
Public 28.2%(111) 24.2%(144)
Both 26%(102) 19%(113)
16. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 63-64 (1966).
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dents disagreed with expansion of the role of the jury in favor of new
mechanisms giving judges a more active role in fact finding.
To simplify the reporting of variables, divisions are constructed. Sec-
tion A explores five questions on the proper role of the jury and the fu-
ture of this civil jury right. Section B examines verdicts. It looks for the
possible presence of preconceived party favoritism by the jury, judicial
agreement with jury verdicts, and judicial involvement with jury verdicts.
Finally, Section C scrutinizes the move to reduce a jury's involvement in
complex cases.
III. JUDICIAL RESPONSES
"The trial judge's views as to the value of the jury are especially enti-
tled to respectful hearing: he is the daily observer of the jury system in
action, its daily partner in the administration of justice, and the one who
would be most affected if the civil jury were abolished." 17 He is the only
neutral party in a trial other than the jury. He also has the advantage of
witnessing the pre-trial rulings and hearings. By the time the jury enters
the picture, the judge has likely made up his mind and is in a good place
to judge a jury. 18
A. REGARD FROM THE GAVEL-How JUDGES VIEW THE CIVIL JURY
"The influence that juries have in determining societal rights and
wrongs-determining what's acceptable and what's not-has been gradu-
ally sliced away."19 Reductions started as an open attempt to reduce both
the criminal (non-capital) jury and the civil jury from twelve persons to
six.20 These patent attempts to alter the jury's traditional form prompted
Justice Marshall to remark that: "It appears.., that the common-law jury
is destined to expire, not with a bang, but with a whimper."'21 Attempts
to utilize a five-member jury were unsuccessful. 22
17. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1074
(1964); Paula L. Hannaford et al., How Judges View Civil Juries, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 247
(1998) ("The trial judge would appear to be the person most capable of forming an in-
formed and objective opinion about the value of civil juries. In addition to extensive
knowledge of trial procedures generally, his or her involvement in pretrial conferences and
evidentiary hearings increases the likelihood that the trial judge is familiar with the specif-
ics of the case and the idiosyncrasies of the lawyers and their clients.").
18. See Michael J. Saks, Public Opinion About the Civil Jury: Can Reality Be Found in
the Illusions?, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 221, 240 (1998) (arguing that public opinion polls, as
opposed to judge polls, are inherently flawed-"The public is ill-informed about major
aspects of the behavior and performance of juries in the tort litigation system; the known
empirical facts of jury behavior contradict, to a considerable extent, the beliefs about juries
expressed in public opinion surveys.").
19. Curriden, supra note 7.
20. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156 (1973) ("In short, what was said in Wil-
liams with respect to the criminal jury is equally applicable here: constitutional history
reveals no intention on the part of the Framers 'to equate the constitutional and common-
law characteristics of the jury.'").
21. Id. at 168 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
22. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 245, 232 (1978) (unanimous ruling that peti-
tioner's trial before a five-member jury deprived him of his constitutional right to a jury
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Within the last thirty years, reductions take issues from the jury rather
than jurors. Procedural mechanisms and review subtly carve out "no-
jury" pockets. This is not to say that constriction is a novel occurrence.
Reductions in an individual's right to have a jury assess fault found their
way to the jury system early through comments on the evidence, the or-
dering of new trials, and the use of remittiturs.2 3 This article argues that
new strategies utilize procedure to an even greater degree.24 In relation
to this argument, several questions from the study target the trial judge's
view of the proper role of the jury and whether its role in litigation should
be reduced. Future reductions can be anticipated from responses to the
following questions:
* Do you think the jury system is:
- Fine just the way it is;
- In good condition, just needs minor work;
- In fair condition, needs work;
- In poor condition, needs overhaul.
* What do you see as the proper role of the jury?





- Left the Same.
* With the continuing debate over tort reform and alternative dispute
resolution, do you believe that:
- Fewer types of cases should be decided by juries;
- More types of cases should be decided by juries;
- The jury system is fine.
* If you were personally a litigant in a civil case, how would you prefer
the dispute be decided?
1. Texas Trial Judges versus Federal Trial Judges
Judicial views on the proper role of the jury differed slightly from state
judges to federal judges. Texas trial judges were 16.9% more likely than
federal judges to see the proper role of the jury as the "conscience of the
community," while federal judges were slightly (3%) more likely to view
its proper role as that of "truth seekers." Within the state responses,
judges sitting in lesser populated areas were 10% more likely than those
trial by relying on empirical data which "suggest that progressively smaller juries are less
likely to foster effective group deliberation").
23. Jeffrey Robert White, The Civil Jury: 200 Years Under Siege, TRIAL, June 2000, at
18, 23.
24. Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury In America: Scenes From an Unappreciated His-
tory, 44 HASTINGS L. J. 579, 605 (1993) (giving several examples of the demise of the jury:




in densely populated areas to see the proper role as the "conscience of
the community." Those judges sitting in areas with greater than 500,000
residents were 16% more likely to see the proper role of the jury as
"truth seekers." 25
This question is limited by the "words of art" used. "Conscience of the
community" and "truth seekers" are difficult to define. One would as-
sume that "conscience of the community" is more likely to respond to
community biases, feelings, and understandings whereas "truth seekers"
are slightly less bound by community norms, but this is unclear. Texas
favors the broad-form jury submission.2 6 This likely captures the "con-
science of the community" more than the specific verdict form. While
this article takes no opinion on the effect of broad-form submission on
jury effectiveness or understanding, 27 Texas' use may have helped state
judges shape what they saw as the "proper role" based on experience.
Extension of everyday experience into judges' normative conclusions
about the proper role of the jury is also arguably seen in the breakdown
of responses by population densities. Judges sitting in smaller, more
tight-knit communities were much more likely to see the proper role as
"conscience of the community" than those sitting in larger cities.
Both state and federal judges gave the jury system positive marks.
When asked how the jury is doing, 58.7% of Texas trial judges responding
answered that it was "good," and needed only "minor work." Federal
judges were 18.7% more likely to answer that the system was "fine just
the way it is." In contrast to the "A" and "A+" score on this abstract
question, nearly one-third of the judges argued that with the continuing
debate over tort reform and alternative dispute resolution, fewer types of
cases should be decided by juries (see table 4).28 Likewise, nearly one-
quarter of the responding judges argued that the right of individuals to
have their civil disputes decided by a jury needs to be reduced (see table
25. In an amusing twist, the judges sitting in areas with less than 10,000 residents were
10% less likely to want a jury deciding their case as a personal civil litigant than those
judges sitting in areas with greater than 500,000 residents. They were 5.8% more likely to
want a judge and 11.4% more likely to want arbitration.
26. Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. 1990) (interpreting Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 277 to prefer the use of the broad-form submission whenever
possible); but see H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Warner, 845 S.W.2d 258, 260 (Tex. 1992) (find-
ing that it is not harmful error to submit a granulated charge in certain instances).
27. See Island Recreational Dev. Corp. v. Republic Of Tex. Sav. Ass'n, 710 S.W.2d
551, 555 (Tex. 1986) (arguing that broad-form submission was designed to simplify the
jury's charge).
28. As the table illustrates, Texas judges were slightly more likely to argue that fewer
types of cases should be decided by the jury:
TABLE 4:
Texas Federal Total
Fewer Types 30.1%(118) 27.4%(163) 28.5%
More Types 4.1%(16) 2.9%(17) 3.4%
Jury System is Fine 62.5%(245) 67.8%(403) 66%
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Although federal courts are no stranger to reducing the role of the jury
in a typical civil trial,30 Texas has taken great strides to make the presence
of the gavel harder to ignore in jury trials.31 Yet, federal district judges
were 6.7% more likely than Texas trial judges to believe that the role of
the jury should be reduced, and Texas judges were 2.2% more likely to
think the right of individuals to have their civil disputes decided by a jury
needs to be expanded (see table 6).32 Though not a double-digit dispar-
ity, it is difficult to square the study's figures with Texas' apparent readi-
ness to take questions away from the jury. The sentiment from the
highest court in Texas is captured by one of its justices: "If we were to
leave it to jurors what the law should be and arrive at any outcome the
jurors desired, we would end up with a very unpredictable system."'33
The statistical variance contrasts Texas' duty jurisprudence 34 and eviden-
29. TABLE 5:
Texas Federal Total
Expanded 7.1%(28) 4.9%(29) 5.8%
Reduced 19.4%(76) 26.1%(155) 23.4%
Eliminated .3%(1) 1.3%(8) .9%
Left the Same 71.4%(280) 66.5%(395) 68.5%
30. This article focuses on the civil jury. Several questions in the study related to the
criminal jury as well. Those notable to this section include: Do you favor or oppose non-
unanimous jury verdicts in non-capital criminal cases, and do you favor or oppose non-
unanimous jury verdicts in capital cases? On each of these questions, female judges op-
posed the use of non-unanimous jury verdicts 8% more in non-capital cases and 4% more
in capital cases. Conservatives were 27% more likely to favor use in non-capital and 10%
more likely to favor in capital offenses. Texas judges from cities with less than 10,000
residents were 10% more likely to oppose use on non-unanimous verdicts in non-capital
cases than those judges sitting in cities with over 500,000 residents and 11% more likely to
oppose such verdicts in capital cases. Texas state judges were just slightly more likely to
favor the use of non-unanimous verdicts in capital and non-capital criminal cases. Una-
nimity dates back to English common law. In 1972, the Supreme Court re-examined this
long-standing requirement and concluded that the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees
the right to a jury trial in criminal cases, does not require that the jury's verdict be unani-
mous. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DE-
MOCRACY (1994). A Texas task force is considering major changes designed to increase
public confidence in the justice system. Mark Curriden, State Panel Seeks Pay Raise for
Juries-Task Force to Unveil Court Reform Plans, Including Call to Add to Judges' Power,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 15, 1997, at IA, available at 1997 WL 11520617. On the
agenda, is a suggestion to abandon in Texas the "centuries-old" requirement that criminal
verdicts be unanimous. Id.
31. Curriden, Tipping the Scales, supra note 7 (quoting Chief Judge Phil Hardberger,
Juries Under Seige, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 12 (1998)). "Over the last 10 years, the [Texas
Supreme] Court has taken great measures to limit the power of juries.").
32. TABLE 6:
Expanded Reduced Eliminated Left the Same
Texas 7.1%(28) 19.4%(76) .3%(1) 71.4%(280)
Federal 4.9%(29) 26.1%(155) 1.3%(8) 66.5%(395)
33. Tipping the Scales, supra note 7 (quoting Justice Abbott).
34. See William V. Dorsaneo, III, Judges, Juries, and Reviewing Courts, 53 SMU L.
REV. 1497 (2000) (discussing the Texas Supreme Court's activist movement in the no-evi-
dence standard of review and duty arenas).
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tiary jurisprudence, two areas where judges frequent the jury's arena.35
a. Duty in Texas
"It may not be amiss, here, gentlemen, to remind you of the good old
rule, that on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on questions
of law, it is the province of the court, to decide. ''36 Law students are
quick to learn this absolute distinction in their first year: legal determina-
tions are for the court, fact-finding is for the jury. As with most absolutes
in law school, this too is less than rigid. Chief Justice Marshall blurs the
distinction in the course of the trial of Burr: "Levying of war is a fact
which must be decided by the jury. The court may give general instruc-
tions on this as on every other question brought before them, but the jury
must decide upon it as compounded of fact and law"?37
Evidence exists to support the proposition that the Massachusetts Bay
Colony gave the jury significant authority over law and fact in the colo-
nial era.38 This is certainly not the case now. The United States Supreme
Court pronounced the jury's purpose in civil cases: "[T]o assure a fair and
equitable resolution of factual issues."' 39 There was no disguising the ef-
fect of this judge/jury dichotomy in the contributory negligent jurispru-
dence. Before the onset of comparative fault and modified comparative
fault, workers found contributorily negligent were barred from any jury
recovery, as a matter of law. 40 Today, courts embrace "as a matter of
law" distinctions in situations that look pretty factual. In doing so, they
arguably modify Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co. 41
In 1928, Justice Cardozo warned that the determination of negligence
must first be rooted in a "wrong." Palsgraff questioned whether the de-
fendant's alleged "wrong" could be a "wrong in its relation to the plaintiff
standing far away."'42 The risk "reasonably to be perceived defines the
duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation. ' 43 Whether the plaintiff,
Ms. Palsgraff, stood within the "zone of danger" to justify a "wrong" cer-
tainly appears factual. Justice Cardozo on occasion, voiced his concern
over the jury system: "Few would be so narrow or provincial as to main-
tain that a fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible
35. While not explored here, the Texas Supreme Court's no-evidence summary judg-
ment has increased the burden on non-movants. Id. As described by Chief Justice Phillips,
the court has "upped the ante in summary judgment. It was a conscious decision that court
dockets are expanding more rapidly than court resources." See Curriden, Tipping the
Scales, supra note 7).
36. State v. Brailsford, U.S. (3 Dall.) 1,4 (1794).
37. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 66 (1895) (quoting 1 BURR'S TRIAL 470).
38. Landsman, supra note 24, at 592. Landsman cites William Nelson as portraying
Massachusetts's trials as being conducted before three judges, each of whom could give
their version of the "law." Faced with varying accounts, the jury played a larger role in
assessment of law.
39. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973).
40. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 137 (1997)
41. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 341 (1928) (Cardozo, C. J.).
42. Id. at 341.
43. Id. at 344.
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without [trial by jury.]"' 44 He would likely not be guilt ridden upon the
assertion that invasion of the province of the jury results from his "no-
duty" pronouncement. Nevertheless, Texas' duty jurisprudence stretches
Palsgraff beyond even Cardozo's vision.
Benoit v. Wilson reaffirmed the historic Texas Supreme Court pro-
nouncement that a reviewing court cannot substitute its own factual con-
clusion for that of a fact-finder who has fulfilled its responsibilities. 45
Although even this is questionable under the current Texas Supreme
Court jurisprudence, 46 a way around Benoit is through the front door-
duty. Dean William Powers described Texas' duty jurisprudence as
"moving away from broad definitions of duty and toward particularized
definitions of duty."'47 Although most of Powers' article is "academic" in
nature, he does characterize this movement by the court as a wise deci-
sion not to give broad policy-making authority to the jury.48 "What is
really happening is that the court is reinvigorating the concept of duty,
and the court is doing this for intellectually sound reasons. Recognizing
that fact has important ramifications for Texas lawyers."' 49 This "reinvig-
oration" looks an awful lot like particularized extensions into the jury's
province based on the facts of a case. As discussed, Justice Cardozo's
duty analysis in Palsgraf involved a factual testing. Yet, there was a nor-
mative aspect to its investigation. The "zone of danger" inquiry can be
repeated with some degree of regularity in later cases.50 The Texas hori-
zon, in contrast, is just too particularized to have much bearing on a sig-
nificant number of later cases. The jury's province is thus consumed in
the name of short-term gratification. 51
Justice Andrews' proximate cause has not been completely subsumed
by "duty" in Texas. But examples of the particularized duties announced
within the last ten years undoubtedly demonstrate the pervasiveness of
the judge in factual deliberations. 52 In Mellon Mortgage v. Holder, a plu-
44. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
45. 239 S.W.2d 792, 796 (Tex. 1951).
46. See Hardberger, supra note 31, at 3-13 (criticizing the current "conservative, ac-
tivist" Texas Supreme Court for its use of "legal tools of 'no duty,' 'no proximate cause,'
'no evidence,' 'insufficient evidence,' 'unreliable experts,' 'unqualified experts,' and 'junk
science"' to wipe out jury verdicts and providence.). Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 968
S.W.2d 934, 938 (Tex. 1998) and Provident Am. Ins. Co. v. Castaneda, 988 S.W.2d 189, 200
(Tex. 1998) are two examples of the current "no-evidence" jurisprudence.
47. William Powers, Jr., Judge and Jury in the Texas Supreme Court, 75 TEXAs L. REV.
1699, 1700 (1997)
48. Id. at 1719.
49. Id. at 1704.
50. But see Dorsaneo, supra note 34, at 1524 (arguing that Cardozo's analysis is
particularized).
51. See id. at 1498 ("During roughly the same ten-year period, the Texas Supreme
Court has otherwise modified the respective roles of judges, juries, and reviewing courts in
Texas by revising its treatment of the duty and causation issues in tort cases.").
52. Texas' duty question involves a two-part test. First, the court must consider the
risk, foreseeability, and likelihood of injury weighed against the social utility of the actor's
conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the consequence
of placing that burden on the actor. Bird. v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tex. 1994). If
the court decides that the various factors do not weigh in favor of imposing a duty, then it
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rality of the court embraced Palsgraffs no-duty analysis.5 3 A woman sex-
ually assaulted by a police officer in a garage was found to be an
"unforeseeable plaintiff." Danger of this type was foreseeable given the
regularity of criminal activities at or near the garage. Nonetheless, given
that the plaintiff was accosted several blocks from the garage before be-
ing forced to drive to the garage, she, as a plaintiff, was not in the "zone"
of foreseeable danger. The infusion of Texas' proximate cause foresee-
ability test into the duty analysis was criticized by the concurrence.5 4 Had
the court opted to follow their traditional premises-liability framework,
as suggested by the dissent, the plaintiff could have been a licensee. The
defendant would thus have owed her a duty given the degree of crime
known in the area.55
For all its harm to Ms. Holder in Mellon, this "foreseeable-plaintiff"
test was not even mentioned in a later case, Van v. Pena.56 Pena involved
the brutal assault and murder of two girls by a teenage gang. The grue-
some violence occurred in a wooded area just next to premises where a
convenience store sold the underage gang members alcohol. The girls
were not "unforeseeable" in a Palsgraf sense because they were in the
zone of danger. Nevertheless, given the uproar organized by the Mellon
concurrence and dissent over the wholesale abandonment of precedent in
that case, one would expect at least a mention of whether Palsgrafs zone-
of-danger exception to general premises rules applies in Texas. Instead,
the court simply reverted to its proximate cause analysis to deny relief.
In addition to these individualized holdings, the court cautioned that
the question whether a hazard is an "open and obvious danger" for inad-
equate-warning product-liability claims is a question of law, not fact.5 7 It
also advocated looking to proximity, recency, frequency, similarity, and
publicity, in a particularized fashion in each case to determine whether
criminal conduct in premises cases was "foreseeable." 58 Other particular-
ized "no-duty" areas also exist. For instance, there is no stockbroker duty
to ascertain the competence of a principal. 59 No Tarasoff duty to warn
third parties of a patient's threat toward a specific individual exists in
Texas.60 As a matter of law, under case-specific facts, the Yellow Cab
Company in Houston had no duty to warn its cab drivers not to carry
examines whether a special relationship exists between the parties such that a duty should
exist as a matter of law. See also Golden Spread Council, Inc. v. Akins, 926 S.W.2d 287,
290 (Tex. 1992).
53. Mellon Mortgage Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654, 657-58 (Tex. 1999).
54. Id. at 663 (Baker, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 673 (O'Neill, J. dissenting).
56. Van v. Pena, 990 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tex. 1999).
57. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Tex. 1995).
58. Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749, 759 (Tex. 1998)
(no evidence that defendant could have reasonably foreseen the likelihood of violent crim-
inal activity within its apartment complex despite eleven calls within a one mile radius in
the last year (four originating in the complex)).
59. Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Fletcher, 975 S.W.2d 539, 545 (Tex. 1998).
60. Thapar v. Zezulka, 994 S.W.2d 635, 640 (Tex. 1999).
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guns. 61 In a move that spites both the comparative fault statute and the
jury, the Texas Supreme Court also specifically held that a city owed no
duty, as a matter of law, to warn those who are not traveling with reason-
able care upon the adjoining highway. 62 Arguably spurred by their high-
est court, lower courts appear willing to announce particularized "no-
duty" pockets as well. 63
Texas has arguably gone further than federal courts were instructed by
Justice Story to go in 1835:
My opinion is, that the jury is no more a judge of the law in a capital
or other criminal case, upon the plea of not guilty, than they are in
every civil case, tried upon the general issue. In each of these cases,
their verdict, when general, is necessarily compounded of law and of
fact; and includes both. In each they must necessarily determine the
law as well as the fact. . . . But I deny, that, in any case, civil or
criminal, they have the moral right to decide the law according to
their own notions, or pleasure .... It is the duty of the court to in-
struct the jury as to the law; and it is the duty of the jury to follow the
law, as it is laid down by the court. 64
61. Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 526-27 (Tex. 1990); but
see Read v. Scott Fetzer Co., 990 S.W.2d 732, 742 (Tex. 1998) (because manufacturer main-
tained control of its distributor, it owed a limited duty to take some action, even if requir-
ing distributors to do background checks themselves on door-to-door salesmen, to protect
plaintiff customer).
62. City of McAllen v. De La Garza, 898 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Tex. 1995). Justice Cornyn
dissented, stating that "I agree with the court of appeals that '[w]hile this evidence [that the
driver was intoxicated] may prove dispositive at trial, it fails to prove, as a matter of law,
that the City owed no duty to De La Garza as a traveler on the abutting roadway." Id. at
813.
63. Wax v. Johnson, No. 01-98-01202-CV, 2001 WL 83530 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] Feb. 1, 2001, no pet.) (despite usual policy of communicating with an associate before
transfer, no duty existed until defendant first saw plaintiff); Capital Metro. Transp. Auth. v.
Bartel, No. 03-98-00372-CV, 1999 WL 176058 (Tex. App.-Austin Apr. 1, 1999, no pet.)
(after jury awarded $40,159.95 in damages to a blind man suing for recovery from injuries
received after walking into a bus stop sign located in the middle of the sidewalk, the appel-
late court reversed, finding no duty to plaintiff because the condition of the bus stop was
not unreasonably dangerous, as a matter of law). Bartel arguably infringes on the jury's
right not necessarily to find proximate cause, but to find breach under the reasonably pru-
dent person standard. See also King v. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 27 S.W.3d 117, 130 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.) (as a matter of law, no legal duty to defend
King in a personal injury suit existed under the insurance policy, even though a "separation
of insureds" clause existed separating the employer from the employee); Thompson v.
CPN Partners, L.P., 23 S.W.3d 64, 73 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet. h.) (on fact-specific
circumstances, neither shopping center owner nor security company owed duty to survivor
of movie theater employee, even though a past history of assaults and robberies had oc-
curred on premises because "[t]he statistics showing criminal activity at Commerce Park do
not indicate that CPN or Premium leased the theatre to AMC with knowledge of an unrea-
sonable risk of harm from criminal intrusions"); Daftary v. Southwestern Bell Yellow
Pages, No. 05-96-01335-CV, 1998 WL 397346, at *4 (Tex. App.-Dallas July 17, 1998, no
pet.) (as a matter of law, no duty existed to warn plaintiff purchaser of new telephone line
that the phone number was previously assigned to Mr. Gatti's); Allright San Antonio Park-
ing Inc. v. Kendrick, 981 S.W.2d 250, 254-55 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (de-
spite jury award of $4.7 million after parking-lot patron was abducted with an alleged
attendant witness, the appellate court reversed finding no duty).
64. United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14, 545) (Story,
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Few would deny that Texas uses an extremely particularized duty anal-
ysis.65 This specific investigation probes issues that juries should be ana-
lyzing as fact questions.66
b. Other "Questions of Law" in Texas
In addition to "no-duty" designations, many members (one shy of a
majority) of the Texas Supreme Court hope to give judges greater access
to factual questions in the insurance field.67 Those Justices "would take
the resolution of bad-faith disputes away from the juries that have been
deciding bad faith cases for more than a decade" and give it instead to the
judge. 68
Kissing cousin to "no duty" designations is the increased role now
played by judges to admit or exclude expert testimony. The growing bat-
tle over the admissibility of expert testimony exists in both Texas and
federal courts. After Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,69 federal
courts follow a gate-keeping method of harnessing "unreliable" and "ir-
relevant" testimony.70 This procedural structure tightens the admissibil-
ity of expert testimony. Rather than basing "reliability" of evidence on
general acceptance in the particular field in which the evidence belongs,
courts filter "reliable" and "relevant" evidence to the jury by balancing a
series of factors. These range from whether the theory or technique was
prepared specifically for litigation, to whether the theory was subjected to
peer review or publication. 71 In E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robin-
son,72 the Texas Supreme Court expressly adopted the Daubert factors.
In Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Havner,73 the jury awarded a child
born with a limb-reduction birth defect allegedly caused by Benedictin
$3.75 million in actual damages and $30 million in punitive damages. Af-
ter the trial court reduced the punitive award to $15 million and the ap-
pellate court reversed and rendered the punitive damage award, the
Supreme Court found the expert's testimony unreliable. They were then
65. See Michael J. Saks, Judicial Nullification, 68 IND. L. J. 1281, n.18 (1993) (quoting
United States v. Wooton, 518 F.2d 943, 946 (3d Cir. 1975) (footnote omitted)) ("In the
division of responsibilities between judge and jury, the jurors have no prerogative to ques-
tion in the slightest degree the law to be applied to an issue, as announced by the court in
its instructions.").
66. "The view that the particularized application of the general standard should be
conducted by the fact finder, not by the trial judge, is held so strongly that it is conven-
tional for torts scholars to assert that the duty element is easily resolved since all persons
have a general obligation to exercise ordinary care to avoid the infliction of harm on
others." Dorsaneo, supra note 31, at 1535.
67. Universe Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48, 58 (Tex. 1997) (Hecht, J.,
concurring).
68. Id. at 49 (opinion of Spector, J.).
69. 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993).
70. Id. at 579; Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
71. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585.
72. 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995).
549, 556 (Tex. 1995).
73. 953 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex. 1997).
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able to declare "no evidence" to support the jury verdict.74 This extreme
holding not only usurped the jury, but also uprooted the trial judge who
had ruled on the issue of scientific reliability in a motion for summary
judgment, in motions in limine, and in a motion to exclude certain expert
testimony. 75
As evidenced by Havner, Texas may have created a tougher admissibil-
ity standard for experts to meet than at the federal level. In addition to
meeting the two-part "relevance" and "reliability" test, expert testimony
will be excluded if "there is simply too great an analytical gap between
the data and the opinion proffered. '76 In Gammill v. Jack Williams Chev-
rolet, the Texas Supreme Court excluded expert testimony that a child in
a car accident had been wearing her seatbelt. Although the expert opin-
ion was based on gliding abrasions found on the child's body and shirt
fibers observed in the seat belt webbing, the court held that the expert
failed to adequately account for "other possibilities" through a probing
comparative survey.77 If Gammill is the threshold, Texas is well posi-
tioned to sculpt one of the most stringent admissibility tests, as a matter of
law.
Although the door is open for challenges on any type of expert, after
Daubert and Robinson Texas courts have been willing to exercise their
gate-keeping function almost exclusively in the context of product liabil-
ity, personal injury, and medical expert testimony. 78 This is the type of
case that first bred false fears of juries following the "white coat" down
any scientific path.79 Studies consistently reject any finding that juries
74. Id. at 730.
75. Id. at 708.
76. Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 727 (Tex. 1998).
77. Id. at 726.
78. See Guillory v. Domtar Indus. Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1331 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming
exclusion of expert testimony where the accident reconstruction expert used a forklift
model different from the one at issue and failed to connect things analytically); Burroughs
Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1995) (testimony of medical doctor about
the cause of plaintiff's injury was held to constitute "no evidence" because it was based on
assumed facts at odds with actual evidence); Purina Mills, Inc. v. Odell, 948 S.W.2d 927,
934 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, writ denied) (excluding evidence from a veterinary ex-
pert arguing that metal in Purina feed caused hardware disease in cows because the con-
nection between the feed and the disease was not tight enough); North Dallas Diagnostic
Ctr. v. Dewberry, 900 S.W.2d 90, 96 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied) (excluding testi-
mony concluding that the plaintiff's health problems were caused by an injection of
iodinated radio contrast dye because the expert could not specify particulars about the
testing technique, the relationship between the technique and the contrast dye, or the
threshold predictability of the test).
79. See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM
(1991) (criticizing what Huber calls "junk science" or "pseudoscience" in the courtroom
ranging from theories of breast cancer caused by a single traumatic fall to children born
with limb defects as a result of Bendectin). But see Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo's Retort:
Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637 (1993) (arguing that Huber should
have researched his subject before setting off a time bomb with his scholarship concerning
"junk science"); Daniel W. Shuman & Anthony Champagne, Removing the People from
the Legal Process: The Rhetoric and Research on Judicial Selection and Juries, 3 PSYCHOL.,
PUB. POL. & L. 242, 255 (1997).
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believe whatever the expert tells them.80 Nevertheless, the gate persists.
The study finds many judges, an astounding 24% on average, believing
the role of the jury in civil cases should be reduced or eliminated and
nearly a third believing fewer types of cases should be given to the jury.
On any front, federal or state, the data reflect a significant willingness to
reduce an individual's jury right. Considering recent particularized "no-
duty" pronouncements and designations (such as those seen with expert
testimony) in Texas shifting power to the judge, the statistical difference
between Texas and federal judges is curious. Perhaps the state trial
judges' hesitation to further reduce the jury right is in reaction to what
many consider an extremely conservative Texas Supreme Court. 81 Or,
this may represent the fact that federal courts are willing to limit the jury
right even more than Texas' active jurisprudence. What the 6.7% differ-
ence between state and federal judges' willingness to reduce the right
does not deny, however, is the general presumption in favor of retaining
the jury system in its current reduced form. In fact, the vast majority,
close to 69%, finds comfort in the current scheme.
2. Circuit Breakdown
Dividing federal responses by circuit failed to render extensive statisti-
cal difference. The Eleventh Circuit repeatedly scored within the range
of those jurisdictions less content with the jury system. For instance,
when asked whether the right of individuals to have their civil disputes
decided by a jury needs to be expanded, reduced, eliminated, or left the
same, the jurisdictions averaged the following: 65.7% opted to leave the
right as it currently exists and 21.9%, on average, opted to reduce the
right. The Eleventh Circuit figures differed considerably: 45.6% of the
judges would leave the right the same, while 45.6% would also reduce the
right.
3. Other Demographics Considered
Responses were also broken down by political ideology, legal back-
ground, and gender. Male, "conservative" judges, on average, were ap-
proximately six percent more likely to see the proper role of the jury as
"truth seekers. ' '82 Male judges from private backgrounds were approxi-
80. Shuman & Champagne, supra note 78, at 255. ("We did not find evidence of a
'white coat syndrome' in which jurors mechanistically deferred to certain experts because
of the field of expertise. Instead we found jurors far more skeptical and demanding in
their assessments .... Instead our data suggest that jurors approach decisions about experts
thoughtfully using a construct that is as sensible as any we might suggest.").
81. Hardberger, supra note 31, at 3 ("The various [conservative] groups who felt vic-
timized by the judicial system of the 1980s were not a homogenous group, but whatever
differences they had were set aside to concentrate on electing conservative, activist judges
to the Texas Supreme Court.").
82. This average can be broken down further. Male judges were 6.6% more likely
than female judges to see the proper role as "truth seekers." The female judges who saw
the proper role as either "scorekeepers" or "conscience of the community" recovered this
difference. "Conservative" judges were 5.8% more likely than those judges labeling them-
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mately nine percent more likely than female judges from public back-
grounds to assess the jury system as "fine just the way it is."'83 This
contentment flipped, however, when asked if the right of individuals to
have their civil disputes decided by a jury needed to be: expanded, re-
duced, eliminated, or left the same. Male judges from private back-
grounds were more likely than female judges from public background by
approximately four percent to argue that the jury right should be
reduced.
Those judges labeling themselves as "liberal" were, interestingly,
14.6% more likely than those labeling themselves "conservative" to see a
need to expand the jury right while "conservative" judges were nine per-
cent more likely to argue for a reduction in the right (see table 7).84 Simi-
larly, when asked whether fewer, more, or the same amount of cases
should be decided by juries given the continuing debate over tort reform
and alternative dispute resolution, those judges labeling themselves "con-
servative" were twenty-four percent more likely than those labeling
themselves "liberal" to respond that "fewer" cases should be decided by
juries (see table 8).85
The tendency of judges claiming to be generally considered "liberal" to
embrace the jury continued on further questioning. Judges were asked
who they would prefer to decide their dispute if a civil litigant. "Liberal"
judges were twenty-seven percent more likely to want a jury to decide
their case. "Conservative" judges were twenty percent more likely to
selves "liberal" to see the proper role as "truth seekers." "Liberal" judges divided this
difference between "scorekeeper" and "arbiters of justice." Judges from a private back-
ground were 5% more likely than judges from a public background to see the proper role
as "truth seekers." Judges from a public background divided this difference among re-
sponses offering the proper role as either "scorekeeper" or "conscience of the
community."
83. Male judges were 10% more likely to say that the jury system is "fine just the way
it is" than their female counterparts. Judges from a private background were 7.5% more
likely to say the jury system is "fine just the way it is" than their public counterparts.
84. About 2.3% of the conservative judges also argued that the jury right should be
eliminated:
TABLE 7:
Expanded Reduced Eliminated Left the Same
Conservative 3.4%(12) 27%(92) 2.3%(8) 65%(225)
Liberal 18%(6) 18%(6) 0%(0) 64%(21)
Moderate 5.8%(32) 21%(119) .2%(1) 71%(391)
85. TABLE 8:
Fewer Decided by Juries More Decided by Juries Fine the Way It Is
Conservative 33%(113) 2.3% (8) 61.7% (213)
Liberal 9%(3) 18%(6) 67%(22)
Moderate 27.7%(152) 2.9%(16) 68%(374)
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want a judge to decide their case (see table 9).86 As noted earlier, how-
ever, because of the low number of respondents categorizing themselves
as "liberal," the results may not be statistically significant, even if
illustrative.87
Looking to the backdrop of recent case law, the "conservative" judges
likely portray a more accurate picture as to the future of the jury. Green-
leaf v. Birth88 held that courts "cannot legally give any instruction which
shall take from the jury the right of weighing the evidence and determin-
ing what effect it shall have." Yet that appears to be exactly what di-
rected verdicts are designed to accomplish. 89 Mourning this usurpation
of the jury, Justice Black dissented in Galloway v. United States: "Since
we do not approve of this sapping of the Seventh Amendment's guaran-
tee of a jury trial, we cannot join even this technical coup de grace." The
"coup" referred to the Court's imprimatur on the eased "substantial" evi-
dence directed verdict standard as constitutional under the Seventh
Amendment. Increasing the use of directed verdicts to disregard jury
findings unearths willing companions in several responding judges.90 De-
creasing the prefecture of the jury is greeted with open arms both in
Texas and on the federal scene. The blur between law and fact is pro-
nounced. New "no-duty" pockets are created, summary judgment effec-
tiveness is augmented, 9' re-evaluation standards are relaxed,92 judicial
gate-keeping roles are enhanced, 93 and as Section B presents, jury ver-
86. TABLE 9:
Judge Jury Arbitration Depends on the Case
Conservative 23%(78) 55%(191) 12%(40) 8%(26)
Liberal 3%(1) 82%(27) 3%(1) 9%(3)
Moderate 17%(93) 60%(329) 10.4%(57) 11%(60)
87. See discussion supra note 15.
88. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 292, 299 (1835).
89. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943) (upholding the constitutionality
of a "substantial" evidence review as opposed to a "scintilla" evidence review as non-inva-
sive of the Seventh Amendment).
90. Texas is slightly different. Directed verdicts or motions for instructed verdict are
appropriate when there is "no evidence" or the party with the burden of proof has the right
to judgment as a matter of law. Seideneck v. Cal Bayreuther Assoc., 451 S.W.2d 752 (Tex.
1970) (stating that more than a "scintilla" of evidence must be shown); Collora v. Navarro,
574 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. 1978) (as a matter of law). If there is "insufficient" evidence, or the
judgment is against the "great weight and preponderance of the evidence," a motion for
new trial may be granted. Cooper v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 430 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
91. Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of
Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIo ST. L. J. 95,
99-100 (1988). Stempel looks critically at Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), as expanding a judge's power at the expense
of the jury.
92. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (re-
examination of a jury finding of "actual malice" is adjudicated under a de novo standard of
review).
93. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Kumho Tire Co. v.
Charmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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dicts may not be sacred. 94
B. How SAY You? A BREAKDOWN OF JUDGES' GENERAL
AGREEMENT WITH JURY VERDICTS
"We perceive attitudes as the driving force behind behavior and assume
that the behavior a person chooses reflects his or her true attitudes. How-
ever, when peoples' attitudes are measured and their behavior observed,
the consistency between the two is surprisingly low." 95 This was seen in
Section A. Despite an extremely positive attitude toward the juries in the
abstract, statistics showed a tendency of many judges to favor a diminu-
tion of the jury when pressed. The questions relating to jury verdicts at-
tempt to unravel this attitude/behavior dichotomy with respect to jury
verdicts. This section probes five related questions:
* How often do you agree with jury verdicts in your cases?
All of the time
- Most of the time
- Half of the time
- Less than half the time




- Not very well
- Have you ever decreased or eliminated a verdict on compensatory or
punitive damages because you didn't believe it was based on fact or law?
* Have you ever made a legal determination that a jury's verdict in
setting damages was too low and then took steps to increase it?
* Coming into a civil case, do you think most jurors:
- Favor the plaintiff
- Favor the defendant
- Favor neither side
Modern perceptions of jury verdicts are extreme: "Juries are believed
to find liability when judges would not, grant higher awards than judges,
and to grant inappropriate punitive damages awards. '96 The Supreme
Court of the United States held that a State violates due process by let-
ting juries set punitive damages but not permitting review for excessive-
ness, 97 found that a citizen sued under the Clean Water Act had a right to
94. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 448 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
95. G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN ET AL., JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS 12 (1997).
96. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending
Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124,1127 (1992); see also Paul Mogin, Why Judges, Not
Juries, Should Set Punitive Damages, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 179 (1998) ("It is time to recognize
that, at least in federal court, asking juries to set punitive damages is nether constitution-
ally required nor sound policy.").
97. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994).
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a jury as to liability, but not to the penalty amount imposed, 98 criticized
punitive damage awards as appealing to the "unbridled discretion" of the
jury, 99 constitutionally approved of the JNOV,' ° constitutionally ap-
proved of the directed verdict,' 0 ' instituted an "inherently imprecise"'10 2
judicial test for determining whether punitive damages were unconstitu-
tionally grossly excessive, 10 3 ruled that a court of appeals should apply de
novo standard when reviewing a district court's determination of consti-
tutionality of punitive damages awards, 10 4 and strengthened its use of
summary judgment as a procedural device to filter cases with insufficient
evidence as a matter of law.'0 5 But verdict studies demonstrate that this
race from jury to judge as arbiter is unnecessary. 10 6 Juries are not found
to be the common marauder. Instead, several factors, including the type
of case, the severity of the injury, the heinousness of the act, and the
amount of proof presented, guide the damage award given by the judge
or the jury.
In 1966, Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel published the classic study
of the American jury.'0 7 They reported that 78 percent of judges in civil
cases would have decided the case the same as the jury.10 8 Recent studies
confirm this agreement.'0 9 This study is no stranger. Ninety-two percent
of the judges in the SMU study responded that they agreed with the jury
98. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 n.9 (1987) ("no evidence that the Framers
meant to extend the right to a jury to the remedy phase of a civil trial" has been seen).
99. Int'l Brd. Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 52 & 51 n.14 (1979) ("[P]unitive
damages may be employed to punish unpopular defendants"); Rosenbloom v. Me-
tromedia, Inc. 403 U.S. 29, 84 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,
59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[P]unitive damages are frequently based upon the
caprice and prejudice of jurors").
100. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
101. Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935).
102. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336 (1998).
103. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996).
104. Cooper Ind., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 121 S. Ct. 1678,
1683 (2001).
105. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
106. Neil Vidmar, Pap and Circumstance. What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us About
Jury Behavior and the Tort System, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1205, 1234 (1994) (arguing that
verdict studies criticizing juries have many methodological problems because "by them-
selves the statistics cannot tell us one way or the other"); Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling
Punitive Damages: Current Data and Further Inquiry, Wis. L. REV. 15, 59 (demonstrating
the rarity of punitive damage awards and the frequency with which judges reduce them:
"TYhere were only 34 punitive damage awards of $1 million or more upheld by the federal
circuit courts of appeals for the period 1984-1994.").
107. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 16.
108. Id. at 63-64.
109. Sentell, supra note 11, at 98-99.
(1991).
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verdict "most of the time" (table 10).11° Further, 76% urged that most
jurors coming into a civil case favor neither the plaintiff nor the defen-
dant,' I I and 73% responded that, in general, juries are doing "very well"
in actually reaching a just and fair verdict. Despite these significantly
positive markers, 47% had decreased or eliminated a jury verdict and
10% had taken steps to increase damages that were set too low. This
finding is in line with modern jury constraints such as statutory caps on
damage awards as well as the traditional judicial remedy of remittitur." 2
Dissection of the responses according to demographic variables further
explores these and other techniques used to invade the jury's historic ver-
dict precinct.
1. Texas Trial Judges versus Federal Trial Judges
Relating to verdict questions, the study revealed significant differences
between the state and federal responses. Although both agreed with jury
verdicts "most of the time,"' " 3 federal district judges were 9% more likely
than state trial judges to argue that juries do "very well" in reaching a just
and fair verdict. Breaking the state responses down further by popula-
tion density, those judges sitting in jurisdictions with a population under
10,000 were 4.5% less likely to agree with the jury verdict "all the time"
than those state judges sitting in jurisdictions with greater than 500,000
residents. Texas state judges were also 15.2% more likely to respond that
coming into a civil case, most jurors favor the defendant (see table 11).114
Although more apt to find the jury doing "very well," federal judges
were 38.8% more likely to have decreased or eliminated a damages ver-
110. TABLE 10:
Total State Federal
All the time 4.9%(48) 5.1%(20) 4.7%(28)
Most of the time 91.5%(903) 90.8%(356) 92.1%(547)
Half of the time 2.3%(21) 2.8%(11) 1.7%(10)
Less than half the time .9%(9) .8%(3) 1.0%(6)
111. About 8.9% argued that most jurors favor the plaintiff coming into a civil case and
11% asserted that most jurors favor the defendant coming into a civil case.
112. Hannaford, supra note 17, at 258 ("Whether implemented as a legislative, judicial,
or contractual arrangement, the sentiment underlying these approaches is the same: civil
juries are untrustworthy and their power to decide liability and impose damage awards on
litigants should be sharply curtailed.").




Favor the plaintiff 6.9%(27) 10.3%(61) 8.6%(88)
Favor the defendant 19.9%(78) 4.7%(28) 12.3%(106)
Favor neither side 66.3%(260) 81.6%(485) 74%(745)
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dict (see table 12),115 and 8% more likely have taken steps to increase a
verdict (see table 13).116 Within the state reporting, those judges from
more thinly populated areas again broke the mold. They were 16% less
likely to reduce a verdict and 23% less likely to increase a verdict (see
table 14). 117
From another State, many of these numbers might be easier to compre-
hend. But Texas has a rich history of altering damage verdicts. "A power
such as may be exercised by juries in awarding exemplary damages is
liable to great abuse .... In cases based on facts which merit condemna-
tion, or even punishment, though not by law constituting a crime, juries,
under commendable impulses, but with judgment warped by passion, no
doubt often render excessive verdicts." 118 Of the fifty-one jury verdicts
reviewed by the Texas Supreme Court between 1997 and 1999, thirty-five
were reversed. 119 In the same period, the court reinstated just one jury
verdict that had been thrown out by a lower court. 120 Texas also, like
approximately nine other states, places severe caps on exemplary damage
awards, requires clear and convincing evidence of the allegations sought
to be established to obtain exemplary damages,121and succumbs a jury's
mental anguish award to a factual sufficiency review.122 Judge Merill
Hartman suggested that "by putting caps on damages, we are saying that
115. TABLE 12:
State Federal Total
Yes 23.7%(93) 62.5%(371) 43.1%(464)
No 68.9%(270) 34.5%(205) 51.7%(475)
116. TABLE 13:
State Federal Total
Yes 5.6%(22) 13.6%(81) 9.6%(103)
No 87%(341) 85.9%(510) 86.5%(851)
117. TABLE 14:
Ever Reduced/Eliminated Taken Steps to Increase a
a Verdict? Verdict?
Yes No Yes No
>500 Thousand 21%(29) 62%(87) 6%(9) 75%(106)
<10 Thousand 22%(12) 78%(42) 1.8%(1) 98%(53)
118. Tynberg & Co. v. Cohen, 13 S.W. 315, 317 (Tex. 1890).
119. Curriden, Tipping the Scales, supra note 7 (citing statistics from records kept by
Court Watch, an Austin based watchdog group);
120. Id.
121. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. § 41.003 (1997 ). After September 1, 1995, exemplary
damages ordinarily may not exceed: (1) two times the amount of economic damages, plus
an amount equal to any non-economic damages found by the jury not to exceed $750.000,
or (2) $200,000. Id. § 41.008(b). These caps do not apply in favor of a defendant found to
have knowingly or intentionally committed conduct described as a felony in specific sec-
tions of the Texas Penal Code. Id. § 41.008(c). See also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 614-19 (1996) (discussing States enacting punitive cap legislation); Cooper Ind.,
Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 121 S. Ct. 1678, 1683, n.6 (2001) (adding
to this list).
122. Saenz v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 925 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. 1996) (appellate
courts must now assess the reasonableness of a jury's mental anguish award).
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we no longer trust juries to do it."'1 23 Judge Phil Hardberger describes
recent movements from the Texas Supreme Court as follows: "[P]revious
expansions of the law were stopped, then rolled backwards. Jury verdicts
became highly suspect and were frequently overturned for a variety of
ever-expanding reasons.1124 Perhaps because the Texas appellate courts
are so diligent in their motivation to reduce or eliminate jury verdicts, the
trial judges pass the buck. "Jury verdicts, few as they may be, are now
subject to harsh scrutiny by conscientious appellate judges who are sworn
to follow the Texas Supreme Court's precedent and who are aware that
the chance of reversal increases if a large plaintiff's verdict is af-
firmed."'1 25 Under Texas law, reversal of a punitive damage award or sug-
gestion of a remittitur may be had only if the evidence supporting the
award is so factually insufficient or the verdict is so against the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust.1 2 6
Under Alamo National Bank v. Kraus, reviewing courts balance the na-
ture of the wrong, the character of the conduct involved, the degree of
culpability of the wrongdoer, the situation and sensibilities of the parties
concerned, and the extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of
justice and propriety.12 7 Despite the extraordinary nature of relief, Texas
courts frequently order remittitur and reversal of punitive damage
awards.128
Federal courts, as the study confirms, are not afraid of upsetting a
jury's damage verdict either. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore129 is a
remarkable case. There, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed a puni-
tive damages award, following a reduction from $4 million to $2 million,
against a foreign automobile manufacturer and American distributor for
failing to disclose that the automobile purchased had been repainted after
being damaged prior to delivery. The Supreme Court, in a plurality opin-
ion authored by Justice Stevens, nevertheless reversed the damages
award as "grossly excessive" and violative of the due process clause. 130
In doing so, the court utilized a three-part test to ascertain whether the
123. Mark Curriden, Jury Awards Fall Under Weight of Obscure Law, DALLAS MORN-
ING NEWS, May 7, 2000, at 23A, available at 2000 WL 20333726 (quoting Dallas County
District Judge Merrill Hartman).
124. Hardberger, supra note 31, at 4.
125. Id. at 8.
126. Trans. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 30 (Tex. 1994).
127. 616 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. 1981).
128. Interstate Bank of Dallas, N.A. v. Risser, 739 S.W.2d 882, 909-10 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1987, no pet. h.); Nissan Motor Co. v. Armstrong, 32 S.W.3d 701 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.) (despite parties' stipulation to a punitive damages
award of $2 million, the court was still authorized to order a remittitur reducing amount to
$800,000); Lesikar v. Rappeport, 33 S.W.3d 282, 315 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, pet.
denied) (reducing punitive damages award from $2 million to $600,000 because the award
appeared to be the "result of passion rather than the result of an objective assessment of
the evidence"); Peshak v. Greer, 13 S.W.3d 421, 428 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no
pet) ("we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this cause for new trial, unless
plaintiff wishes to make voluntary remittitur of the punitive damages award").
129. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
130. Id. at 574.
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constitutional due process line had been crossed: (1) the degree of the
defendant's reprehensibility or culpability; (2) the relationship between
the penalty and the harm to the victim caused by the defendant's actions;
and (3) the sanctions imposed in other cases for comparable miscon-
duct. 31 Dissenting, Justice Scalia took offense at the Court's proactive
movement: "The Constitution provides no warrant for federalizing yet
another aspect of our Nation's legal culture (no matter how much in need
of correction it may be), and the application of the Court's new rule of
constitutional law is constrained by no principle other than the Justices'
subjective assessment of the 'reasonableness' of the award in relation to
the conduct for which it was assessed."'1 32 The willingness of the Court to
disturb a verdict ruling approved by a highest state court sets the thresh-
old of future prudence low. 133
As discussed, Cooper Industries Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,
arguably upset the jury verdict's punitive damage award further. 34
Cooper's pinnacle issue evolved from a false advertisement and trade-
mark infringement dispute. It questioned whether federal appellate
courts should use de novo or abuse of discretion standard when reviewing
a district judge's decision to uphold a punitive damage jury verdict. An
eight-person jury in Cooper awarded Leatherman Tools $50,000 in actual
damages and $4.5 million in punitive damages after Cooper used photo-
graphs of a modified version of plaintiff's tool in posters, advertising, and
packaging to introduce its competing tool. The Ninth Circuit upheld this
award finding no abuse of discretion. Arguing that "[m]eaningful
[c]onstraints [o]n [plunitive [d]amage [a]wards [n]eed [d]iscernible
[p]arameters,"' 35 Cooper Industries succeeded in convincing the United
States Supreme Court that de novo appellate review of a trial judge's de-
cision to uphold a jury verdict is necessary to ensure adequate adjudica-
tion of due process attacks on excessiveness and unpredictability of
punitive damage awards.
The decision looks invasive on the surface but can actually be inter-
preted as fairly mild. The Court does not "conflate" the question of the
proper standard for reviewing the district court's due process determina-
tion with the question of the standard for determining whether the jury
award is in "conformity with due process in the first instance."'1 36 Fur-
ther, the de novo standard is limited to situations when no constitutional
131. Id. at 575-86.
132. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (setting out factors to
measure the reasonableness of a punitive damages award but finding that the punitives
assessed against the insurer, although large in proportion to the insured's compensatory
damages, did not violate due process); Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 418(1994) (holding that an amendment to the Oregon Constitution prohibiting judicial review
of a jury's punitive damages award unless no evidence was found to support the verdict
violated the Due Process Clause).
134. 532 U.S. 424, 121 S. Ct. 1678 (2001).
135. Petitioner's Brief at *12, Cooper (No. 99-2035), available at 2000 WL 1793080
(Dec. 4, 2000).
136. Cooper, 532 U.S. 121 S. Ct. at 1682 n.4.
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issue is raised. Here, the jury's assessment of punitive damages was inter-
preted by the Court as "an expression of its moral condemnation" rather
than a "factual determination" as is found with compensatory damage
determinations. 137 Justice Ginsburg's dissent confronts this apparent dis-
tinction as inaccurate because punitive damages are fundamentally de-
pendent on determinations characterized as fact finding, such as the
extent of harm caused by the defendant's misconduct, whether the defen-
dant acted in good faith, whether the misconduct was part of a broader
pattern, and the malice of the defendant.' 38 The majority apparently un-
derstands this reasoning. Justice Stevens, in footnote 13, expressly leaves
open the opportunity for a State to possibly avoid de novo review.' 39 By
"more tightly" tying a jury's award of punitive damages to the jury's find-
ing of compensatory damages through definitions of punitive damages as
a multiplier of compensatory damages or the like, de novo may be
avoided 4° Thus, though Cooper can be read narrowly, constitutionaliz-
ing the predictability of punitive damages awards through a de novo ap-
pellate review standard nevertheless bites into quasi-factual issues
reserved for the jury in a way that this and other studies have deemed
wholly unnecessary.' 41 In fact, although this article disagrees with an ap-
parent increased willingness of trial judges to limit jury verdicts, the
study's finding that federal trial judges are 38.8% more likely than Texas
trial judges to reduce or eliminate a damages verdict contradicts any pur-
ported need for increased scrutiny of trial judges decisions on appeal.' 42
2. Other Demographics
A nearly 40% difference between state and federal judges' willingness
to reduce or eliminate a jury verdict was uncovered. Because this dispar-
ity affected the breakdown of other demographics, such as gender, on
questions dealing with reductions or additions to jury verdicts, state and
federal responses were analyzed separately as to other demographics.
Reminiscent of the positive marks given in Section A, those labeling
themselves "liberal" were 16% more likely than those labeling them-
selves "conservative" to argue that juries do "very well" in reaching a just
and fair verdict. In line with this, conservative federal judges were 18%
more likely to decrease or eliminate a damages verdict (see table 15).143
In contrast to the "liberal" championing of juries as doing "very well,"
137. Id. at 1683.
138. Id. at 1691 (Ginsbury, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 1687, n.13.
140. Id.
141. See discussion supra notes 107-108 (92% responding that they agree with the jury
verdict "most of the time"); Rustad, supra note 105.
142. See supra note 112.
143. The state responses regarding political affiliation were largely unuseful because
only six (1.5%) of the state judges responded that they would characterize themselves as
"liberal." The federal breakdown for responses from judges questioned on whether they




however, "liberal" judges were 10.3% more likely than "conservative"
judges to take steps to increase a jury verdict thought to be too low (see
table 15). 1 44 This willingness to supplement jury verdicts contrasts with
"liberal" responses from Section A as well. There, the "liberal" judge
was 14.6% more likely to argue that the right to a jury trial should be
expanded and "conservatives" were 9% more likely to argue for its
reduction.
Those judges labeling themselves "conservative" were also 12% more
likely than "liberal" judges to say that jurors come into a civil case favor-
ing the plaintiff. This is in line with the popular view held by the pub-
lic. 145 Modern comparisons of verdict outcomes in federal, civil courts
actually find plaintiff win rates higher in bench trials than in jury trials.' 46
One of the only detectable differences between male and female re-
sponses related to the judges' eagerness to decrease, eliminate, or in-
crease a damages verdict. In line with responses discussed in Section A,
where male judges were slightly more likely to argue for a reduction in an
individual's right to a jury, male judges were 5% more likely in state re-
sponses and 7% more likely in federal responses to decrease or eliminate
a damages verdict not believed to be based on fact or law (see table
17). 1 47 In response to whether the judge had made a legal determination
that a jury's verdict in setting damages was too low and taken steps to
increase it, male federal judges were 10.8% more likely than female fed-
eral trial judges to take steps to increase a verdict believed to be too low.
Similarly, male judges on the state level were 5% more likely to take
TABLE 15:
Conservative Liberal Moderate
Yes 66%(84) 48%(13) 64%(247)
No 31%(40) 52%(14) 33%(127)
144. TABLE 16:
Conservative Liberal Moderate
Yes 11.7%(15) 22%(6) 13%(51)
No 88%(113) 74%(20) 86%(335)
145. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 95, at 1127 ("Tort reformers and others portray
juries as having a pro-plaintiff bias.").
146. Neil Vidmar et al., The Efficacy of the Jury System, VOIR DIRE, Summer 1999, at 9,
13 (discussing Clermont and Eisenberg's large-scale verdict study); Valerie P. Hans, The
Contested Role of the Civil Jury in Business Litigation, 79 JUDICATURE 242, 244, 245 (1996)("Yet results from public opinion surveys and studies of jury decision making clearly show
that the public is quite suspicious of, and sometimes downright hostile to, civil plaintiffs.").
147. TABLE 17:
Texas-Male Texas-Female Federal-Male Federal-Female
Judges Judges Judges Judges
Yes 25%(74) 20%(19) 63%(333) 56%(38)
No 70%(19) 67%(63) 33.6%(177) 41.2%(28)
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steps to increase a jury's verdict (see table 18).148
Dividing the judges based on those practicing in public backgrounds
and those practicing in private backgrounds, on the whole, did not differ
significantly on most verdict questions. When asked whether they had
ever decreased or eliminated a damages verdict, however, state judges
from private backgrounds were 16% more likely than judges moving to
the bench from public backgrounds to alter the verdict (see table 19).149
Though federal judges from a private background were also more likely
to alter or eliminate a damages verdict, the difference (3.1%) was minor.
C. DEOXYRIBONUCLEIC WHAT? How JUDGES VIEW A JURY'S
ABILITY TO HANDLE "COMPLEX" CASES?
"The jury system puts a ban on intelligence and honesty, and a premium
upon ignorance, stupidity, and perjury."150 Mark Twain would likely have
enjoyed Herbert Markman and Positek, Inc. v. Westview Instruments,
Inc.. 5 There, the Supreme Court held that the construction of a patent,
including the terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the prov-
ince of the court. 152 Though the Supreme Court took pains to rest its
holding on the need for "desirable uniformity" on issues of patent con-
struction as opposed to some "complexity" exception to the Seventh
Amendment, language is suspect:
Patent construction in particular "is a special occupation, requiring,
like all others, special training and practice. The judge, from his
training and discipline, is more likely to give a proper interpretation
to such instruments than a jury; and he is, therefore, more likely to
be right, in performing such a duty, than a jury can be expected to
be." 153
The ultimate question of whether a patent has been infringed remains a





Texas-Male Judges Judges Judges Judges
Yes 7%(20) 2%(2) 63%(333) 56%(38)





150. Mark Twain, Roughing It, in WORKS OF MARK TWAIN 2:309 (Franklin R. Rogers
ed. 1972) (1872).
151. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
152. Id. at 390.
153. Id. at 388-89 (quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138,1140 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1849)
(No. 10, 740)).
154. In a related case, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 214
(2000), despite a jury ruling, trial-court denial of JMOL, and circuit affirmation, all finding
for a clothing designer against a retailer selling "knockoff" copies of the designer's clothes,
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While the Markman court did not base its decision on the jury's inabil-
ity to understand complex issues, such as patents, the argument has sup-
porters.' 55 Judge Jerome Frank, one of the harshest critics of the jury
system, abhorred the jury and the inability of jurors "to absorb and evalu-
ate the testimony that they hear and to apply the explanations of the law
tendered to them by the court."'1 56 In a footnote in Ross v. Bernard, the
Supreme Court indicated that "the practical abilities and limitations ofjuries" may affect the right to a trial by jury in civil cases. 157 The Court
declined to answer whether this language supported a Seventh Amend-
ment exception to the right to a jury trial in complex civil cases.' 58
Embracing the opportunity, the Third Circuit picked up where the Su-
preme Court left off. In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litiga-
tion ("Zenith") argued that "a jury is likely to be unfamiliar with ... the
technical subject matter of a complex case... The probability is not re-
mote that a jury will become overwhelmed and confused by a mass of
evidence and issues and will reach erroneous decisions."' 59 Concluding
that a trial by an uncomprehending jury would violate the Fifth Amend-
ment, the court created an exception to the Seventh Amendment. In this
remarkable decision, the court "prohibited trial by jury as soon as [the
judge] perceived, to use the words of the Zenith court, complexity 'so
great that it renders the suit beyond the ability of a jury to decide by
rational means with a reasonable understanding of the evidence and ap-
plicable legal rules."' " 60 The case has had few followers willing to so bla-
tantly disregard an apparent Seventh Amendment pronouncement.' 61
Yet, few would deny that many lack faith in the jury's ability to compre-
hend complex issues and cases.' 62
the Supreme Court reversed. The Court found that in close cases, courts should err on the
side of caution and classify ambiguous trade dress as product design requiring "secondary
meaning." Id.
155. Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex
Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829 (1980); Richard 0. Lempert, Civil Juries and Com-
plex Cases: Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REV. 68 (1981) (arguing that "the
issue of whether the seventh amendment right to jury trial remains inviolate in complex
cases should be left open because we currently lack the information needed for an intelli-
gent resolution").
156. 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 2301 (2d ed. 1995).
157. 396 U.S. 531, 539 n.10 (1970).
158. See In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that no com-
plexity exception exists to the Seventh Amendment), cert. denied sub. Nom., Gant v.
Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
159. 631 F.2d 1069, 1086 (3d Cir. 1980).
160. Patrick Devlin, Equity, Due Process and the Seventh Amendment: A Commentary
on the Zenith Case, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1571, 1599 (1983) (quoting Zenith, 631 F.2d at 1088).
161. See Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); ILC Per-
ipherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978); In re Boise Cas-
cade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976); but see SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec.
Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Phillips v. Kaplus, 764 F.2d 807, 814 (11th
Cir. 1985).
162. Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil
Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 727, 728-29 (1991) ("The increasing complexity of issues
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In City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., Justice Stevens
remarked on the position of trial judges: "Judges who are closer to the
trial process than we are do not share the Court's fear that juries are not
capable of recognizing the difference between independent municipal ac-
tion and action taken for the sole purpose of carrying out an anti-compet-
itive agreement for the private party. ' 163 A single question in the SMU
survey seeks to uncover the judges' view on jury comprehension. The
federal and state trial judges were asked the following question: In gen-
eral, how well do you think the average juror understands the legal and
evidentiary issues in cases? The response options included: "very well,"
"moderately well," "not very well," or "not at all." As seen in Table 20,
approximately 62% of the judges polled asserted that the juries under-
stand the issues "moderately well" and 27% found the juries to under-
stand the issues "very well." Only 9.6% argued that the juries did not
understand "very well" and only .2% asserted "no" understanding on the
part of the jury.
TABLE 20:
Texas Federal Combined
Very Well 17.3 33.5 27
Moderately Well 66.6 59.9 62.5
Not Very Well 15.1 6.1 9.6
Not at all .3 .2 .2
Federal judges on average were 16% more likely than Texas state
judges to find that the juries understand the legal and evidentiary issues
"very well." Likewise, as is consistent with Texas' procedural mecha-
nisms decreasing the role of the jury,164 Texas judges were 9% more
likely to contend that juries do not understand the issues "very well" (see
table 21).165
As far as the response breakdown by circuits is concerned, district
court judges sitting in the Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuit juris-
dictions were less likely to argue that juries understand the legal and evi-
dentiary issues "very well." District court judges sitting in the First,
Fourth, and Seventh Circuit jurisdictions were slightly more likely to ar-
gue that the jury understands the issues "very well" (see table 22).166
Judges characterizing themselves as "liberal," were 17.4% more likely
to argue that the jury understands the issues "very well." In contrast to
presented for adjudication causes some commentators to question the ability of civil juries
to fulfill [their] traditional role.").
163. 499 U.S. 365, 395-96 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. See discussion, supra Section A.
165. TABLE 21:
Very Well Moderately Well Not Very Well Not At All
Texas 17.3%(68) 66.6%(261) 15.1%(59) .3%(1)
Federal 33.5%(199) 59.9%(356) 6.1%(36) .2%(1)
166. The average percentage among the different jurisdictions were as follows:
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the connection between liberal and female responses found in section A,
female judges on this question were 4% more likely than male judges to
say that juries did not understand the issues "very well," and males were
7% more likely to argue that juries comprehend the legal and evidentiary
issues "very well" (see table 23).167
The vast majority of judges polled-more than 60%-argued that the
jury understands complex issues "moderately well" which is consistent
with earlier studies.168 This finding, combined with the responses indicat-
ing that judges overwhelmingly agree with the jury's verdict, does not
support the need for a complexity exception, even assuming some due
process or equity distinction exists. In ferreting out whether a jury pos-
sesses the tools to tackle a complex or technical case, the "collective abil-
ity" of the jury cannot be underestimated. "Apart from the occasional
situation in which a judge possesses unique training ... the assumption
that a jury collectively has less ability to comprehend complex material
than does a single judge is an unjustified conclusion." 169
IV. CONCLUSION
Blackstone would be appalled to learn that what he described as "the
most transcendent privilege ... any subject can enjoy" transcends no
more in England. 170 The destiny of the "Manor Farm" is likely not in the
near future for the American civil jury system. That said, less subtle
mechanisms-such as appellate standards of review, directed verdict
standards, gate-keeping mechanisms on evidence, particularized "no-
duty" pronouncements, novel designations of complexity exceptions, and
TABLE 22:
Very Well Moderately Well Not Very Well Not At All
All Circuits 34.1 58.4 6.9 .15
In contrast to the 34.1% average under the "very well" column, the Ninth Circuit averaged
27.7%, the Tenth Circuit averaged 27.3%, the Eleventh Circuit averaged 26.3%, and the
D.C. Circuit averaged 28.5%. On the higher end, the First Circuit averaged 45%, the
Fourth Circuit averaged 42.9%, and the Seventh Circuit averaged 43.1%. Notably, trial
judges within the D.C. Circuit were, on average, 7.3% more likely to argue that the jury
did not understand the issues very well. Limitations caution against making too many gen-
eralizations from data out of the D.C. Circuit because the response rate from district
judges sitting in that jurisdiction was low. While the other eleven federal jurisdictions
polled averaged fifty-three respondents, only seven district judges from the D.C. Circuit
jurisdictions responded.
167. TABLE 23:
Very Well Moderately Well Not Very Well Not At All
Male 28%(233) 62%(513) 9%(74) .2%(2)
Federal 21%(34) 64%(105) 13%(21) 0%(0)
168. Sentell, supra note 11, at 116 (finding that 92% of the judges questioned rejected
jury miscomprehension as the reason for any disagreement between the judge on verdict).
169. Higginbotham, supra note 8, at 53; see also Kalven, supra note 17, at 1067 ("[t]he
jury can operate by collective recall. Different jurors remember, and make available to all,
different items of the trial so that the jury as a group remembers far more than most
members could as individuals.").
170. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379.
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tools capable of reducing or eliminating a jury's damages verdict-chip
away at the traditional role of the jury.
The study questioned judges as to their view of the role of the jury, the
accuracy of verdicts, and the precision of jury comprehension in an effort
to better understand where the civil jury now stands and where it is likely
to stand in the future. In contrast to previous studies, the study spread its
base purposefully broad so as to encompass all federal trial judges in the
United States and all state trial judges in Texas. This Article broke down
responses by demographic variables. In what is one of the most salient
findings, most judges in the abstract ardently support the civil jury system
and approximately 92% agree with the jury's verdict "most of the time."
Yet, as the responses indicate, the dichotomy between attitude and be-
havior cannot be underestimated. While the significant majority praised
the jury system, nearly a third of the respondents argued that fewer types
of cases should be decided by a jury, nearly a quarter pushed for reduc-
tions in an individual's jury right, and federal judges were nearly 40%
more likely to have reduced or eliminated a jury verdict than trial judges
from a State active in its application of limitations on the jury. Though
tremors were not predicted, the data arguably mirror sentiments sur-
rounding the subtle yet deliberate drain on the jury system. What is
more, several responding judges indicated that the procedural erosion is
and should be still in its youth. "Four legs good ... "
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